THE CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN A SPECIAL COURT. SOME THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM. by Ferreres, Victor
 1
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 If one examines the legal landscape of contemporary Europe, one will be struck by the 
institutional salience of Constitutional Courts. In a long evolution that started after the First 
World War and that reached its climax after the fall of Communism, most European countries 
have established these special courts in order to protect their national Constitutions against 
offensive legislation. Europe is now clearly associated with a “centralized model” of 
constitutional review, where only one court has authority to strike down a statute as 
unconstitutional, while the United States exemplifies the “decentralized model”, where all 
courts are empowered to set aside legislation if it violates the Constitution1.  
Historically, the European option in favor of a centralized model is basically linked to 
the value of legal certainty. If all courts were given the power to review the constitutional 
validity of legislation, disagreement would arise among them. This would make the law more 
uncertain for both citizens and governmental authorities. In contrast, if only a Constitutional 
Court has the power to check legislation, there is no risk of disagreement among courts. 
Centralization is thought to be an efficient solution to the problem of judicial divergence2.  
                                                 
1 So, for example, 17 out of 25 countries within the European Union (after the 2004 
enlargement) have Constitutional Courts: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. For a very complete description of the different ways in which constitutional review has 
been articulated in Europe, see Marco Olivetti and Tania Groppi (editors), La giustizia costituzionale 
in Europa (Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 2003). 
2To a certain extent, this justification of the centralized model is nowadays in crisis. In 
contemporary Europe there are pressures, both internal and external, that are pressing in a 
decentralizing direction. I have examined this issue elsewhere. See, Victor Ferreres Comella, “The 
European model of constitutional review of legislation: Toward decentralization?”, I.CON. International 
Journal of  Constitutional Law, Volume 2, number 3, July 2004, pp. 461-191 (forthcoming).  
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But quite apart from this foundational rationale of the centralized model, the decision 
to centralize review in a special court may have had other effects (whether intended or not). 
In this article, I will offer some thoughts about the consequences of this choice in connection 
with two questions: first, the degree to which Constitutional Courts can avoid constitutional 
issues; and second, the extent to which they can engage in a deferential type of review when 
they check legislation. My main thesis is that, other things being equal, Constitutional Courts 
are less likely than the courts in a decentralized model to engage in these two forms of 
passivism. Some features of constitutional courts press them in the direction of activism.   
I want to be clear at the outset, however, that many other factors are relevant to 
account for the degree of passivism or activism of courts in a given country. So, for example, 
in order to have a complete picture, one would need to examine the political process that a 
country has; what are the dominant cultural assumptions about the role of courts; what are the 
possible connections between the domestic courts and supranational institutions and 
practices; as well as many others. These other factors may reinforce or, on the contrary, work 
against the potential consequences of establishing a special constitutional court. My point is 
simply that if a country sets up a constitutional court, it introduces a vector of activism. That 
is, other things being equal, the country with a constitutional court will tend to have a more 
activist type of judicial review.  
Before arguing my case, however, it is important to isolate some features of the 
centralized model that are relevant to the discussion. 
 
2.  A “DUALIST STRUCTURE”  
 
I propose that we say that the centralized model is based on a dualist structure, for it 
divides the judiciary (understood in a broad sense) into two parts: “ordinary courts”, on the 
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one hand, and the “Constitutional Court”, on the other. It assigns different tasks to each of 
them. To simplify, it assigns ordinary courts the “ordinary judicial function”, which consists 
of applying legislation to decide concrete cases, while it entrusts the Constitutional Court 
with the “constitutional function”, which consists of reviewing the validity of legislation 
under the Constitution. In contrast, we can say, the decentralized, American model, is based 
on a monist structure: there is a single judicial branch, which exercises the two functions at 
the same time. 
One of the potential advantages of the dualist structure is that it is possible (although 
not necessary) to design the Constitutional Court in a different way than ordinary courts. 
Thus, a more “political” procedure may be chosen to select the members of the Constitutional 
Court, while a more “bureaucratic” or strictly “professional” procedure may be followed to 
appoint ordinary judges. Or limited tenure may be granted to the members of the 
Constitutional Court, while tenure for life, or until retirement age, may be awarded to the 
ordinary judges. These and other combinations are possible, and the extent to which the final 
design of Constitutional Courts will differ in this regard from that of ordinary courts may 
vary from country to country. The basic point, however, is that a dualist structure makes 
room for more institutional variation than a monist structure.   
The dualist structure that characterizes the centralized model can be more or less rigid. 
In this regard, two factors should be taken into account. We can call them the purity of the 
Constitutional Court, and its autonomy. 
 
a) Purity refers to whether or not constitutional review of legislation is the only 
function that the Constitutional Court performs. As I said, it is a defining feature of the 
centralized model that the Constitutional Court is the only court that can strike down 
legislation. But this does not necessarily mean that constitutional review of legislation is the 
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only function of that Court. It may have other tasks too, and these tasks will require the Court 
to apply ordinary legislation to particular cases. So, for instance, it may have jurisdiction to 
supervise the regularity of the elections, to enforce the criminal law against high 
governmental authorities, to check the validity of administrative decisions and regulations on 
federalism grounds, to protect fundamental rights against administrative and judicial 
decisions, etc. To the extent that a Constitutional Court does some of these things, it shares 
with ordinary courts the power to apply legislation to ordinary cases3. The distinction 
between the Constitutional Court and ordinary courts is not then a perfect mirror of the 
foundational distinction between the constitutional function and the ordinary judicial 
function. We can say that a Constitutional Court is not pure if, apart from reviewing 
legislation, it has other functions. It is the less pure the more important those other functions 
are, and the larger the amount of workload they generate.  
In Western Europe, for example, we can locate Constitutional Courts at different 
points within a spectrum of purity. On one extreme, we find absolutely pure Constitutional 
Courts, whose only function is to review legislation for its constitutionality (Belgium and 
Luxembourg). Next we find Courts that perform some additional tasks, although their main 
function is still constitutional review of legislation (France, Italy). At the other end of the 
spectrum, some Courts have jurisdiction over so many different and relevant matters that it 
would be wrong to say that, in practice, their most important function is to check legislation 
(Germany, Austria, Spain and Portugal).   
 
                                                 
3 The main difference is that in the rare case where the relevant statutory provision is 
unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court can disregard it, whereas ordinary courts cannot do so on 
their own authority. On the way the Constitutional Court is required to act when confronted with such 
a statute in a concrete case, see the comparative study of Luis Javier Mieres, El incidente de 
constitucionalidad en los procesos constitucionales. (Especial referencia al incidente en el recurso de 
amparo) (Madrid: Civitas-IVAP, 1998).  
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b) The second factor to consider is autonomy, that is, the extent to which the 
Constitutional Court is detached from the ordinary judiciary, with no links connecting the 
two. This depends, in large part, on the procedures that are established to reach the 
Constitutional Court.  
Consider two possible ways in which a statute can be brought to the Court. The first is 
through a “constitutional challenge”: Certain public institutions can go to the Court and 
attack a statute in the abstract4. There is no concrete case that triggers their action. Nor are 
they required to go to the ordinary courts first: they must file their challenge directly to the 
Constitutional Court. The second avenue to reach the Court is through a “constitutional 
question”. If an ordinary judge that is deciding a concrete case thinks that the applicable 
statute is (or may be) unconstitutional, she is required to suspend the proceedings and raise a 
question to the Constitutional Court. The latter will decide whether the statute is valid or not. 
It will then be for the ordinary judge to decide the particular case accordingly.  
Obviously, there is an important difference between these two procedures. In the 
context of an abstract challenge, the Constitutional Court is not linked to the ordinary 
judiciary, while there is such a link when it decides a question sent by an ordinary judge. If 
we take this into account, we can say that the dualist structure is more rigid in France, where 
there are abstract challenges, but no constitutional questions, than it is in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain, where ordinary courts can react to an 
unconstitutional statute by sending questions to the Constitutional Court. The French 
Constitutional Court is thus more detached from the rest of the judiciary than the Courts of 
these other countries.  
Some Constitutional Courts, moreover, have the authority to review judicial decisions. 
Thus, in Spain and Germany, individuals are granted the right to file a “constitutional 
                                                 
4 In some countries, individuals who are particularly affected by a statute may bring a 
challenge too. 
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complaint” if they think that one of their fundamental rights has been violated. Normally, 
before filing such a complaint, it is first necessary to seek remedies in the ordinary courts. 
The violation of the fundamental right may derive from a governmental decision that the 
ordinary courts have later failed to invalidate, or from the judicial decision itself. Through 
this complaint procedure, a strong link is established between ordinary judges and the 
Constitutional Court. The latter becomes in practice the highest supreme court of the judicial 
system, although its jurisdiction is restricted to the issue whether a fundamental right has 
been infringed. From this perspective, the dualist structure is less rigid in Spain and 
Germany, for example, than it is in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg, where 
there is no complaint procedure of this sort5.  
 
In sum, the dualist structure may be more or less rigid, depending on how pure the 
Constitutional Court is, and how autonomous it is vis-à-vis the rest of the judiciary. The more 
functions the Court must carry out (besides constitutional review of legislation), and the 
stronger its links with the ordinary courts, the less rigid that structure is. The less rigid the 
dualism of that structure is, the more it resembles the monist structure that characterizes the 
American, decentralized, model of constitutional review. And, to this extent, the more 
nuanced will be the differences between the “European model” and the “American model” 
that I will try to highlight throughout my argument.   
With this background in mind, I will now offer some thoughts about what 
consequences are more likely to follow if a country chooses a Constitutional Court as 
guardian of the Constitution. 
 
3. THE “CONSCIOUSNESS” OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS   
                                                 
5 In Austria there is a complaint procedure against administrative decisions, but the cases are 
directly brought to the Constitutional Court.        
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Although it is not crucial to support my argument, it should first of all be noted that a 
country may resort to a dualist structure for an “expressive” purpose. A political community 
may decide to express its full commitment to the Constitution as the supreme law of the land 
(or to interpret that there is such an underlying commitment) through the establishment of an 
institution that is created with the specific purpose of protecting the Constitution against the 
legislature. If the superior rank of the Constitution has to be made visible, a court is erected 
that stands out as a special institution in charge of protecting it. In the same way that a 
country may realize that the protection of the environment is an important goal and may 
decide to create a new institution to deal with the matter, some European countries that 
suffered dictatorships have expressed their commitment to the new, democratic Constitutions 
through the establishment of Constitutional Courts. A closer analogy is the European Court of 
Human Rights. After the moral disaster of Nazism and Fascism, European countries decided 
to build a new institution that would guard human rights against violations by the States. 
Apart from the technical functions that the European Court exercises, it performs an 
expressive function: it symbolizes the culture of rights that European countries tried to 
generate after the Second World War. 
But even if there is no expressive rationale behind the decision to establish a 
Constitutional Court, such a Court is nevertheless expected to be particularly sensitive to 
constitutional issues. It cannot be oblivious to the very reasons that led the framers to 
establish it as a specialized institution: to protect the Constitution against offensive 
legislation.  
In particular, other things being equal, the Court will find it difficult to avoid the 
constitutional issues that are brought to it. It will also find it difficult to resort to very 
deferential standards of review when checking statutes. The more rigid the dualist structure 
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(the more the Court is “pure” and “autonomous”), the harder it will be for that Court to 
engage in any of these two forms of passivism.    
 
4. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND AVOIDANCE 
 
In the American context, Alexander Bickel wrote extensively about what he called the 
“passive virtues”. He argued that, because constitutional matters are highly controversial, the 
Supreme Court should not decide them unless the time is ripe for the Court to do so. He 
celebrated the fact that the Supreme Court, because it has discretionary jurisdiction (through 
the writ of certiorary, basically), can select its cases and “decide not to decide”. He also 
suggested that the Court should review a statute as it applies to a particular type of case, 
without going further than that. He argued, moreover, that constitutional considerations 
should only come into play when the case cannot be disposed of on ordinary legal grounds. 
And he advocated the avoidance canon, which requires judges to choose an interpretation of a 
statute that prevents a constitutional issue from emerging6.   
Constitutional Courts, however, find it difficult to cultivate these passive virtues. 
They cannot easily avoid the constitutional issues that are brought to it, and they cannot, 
therefore, easily create a buffer zone around themselves so as not to tread into dangerous 
terrain. The centralized model is structurally “anti-Bickellian”. Several features of the model 
account for this result.   
 
4.1. NO DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION 
 
                                                 
6 See, generally, Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1962). For a more recent defence of this thesis, see Cass Sunstein, One Case at a 
Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
These different forms of avoidance were enumerated by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S 288 (1936), 346. 
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Because the Constitutional Court is the only institution that is authorized to declare a 
statute unconstitutional, it would make no practical sense to give that Court the power to 
select its cases. No constitutional review of legislation by the Court would mean no 
constitutional review at all. Thus, if a public institution brings an abstract challenge against a 
statute, or an ordinary judge raises a question, the Constitutional Court must give an answer 
to it (provided all the procedural requirements are met). If the Court declined to give an 
answer, the statute would escape constitutional review7.  
Things are different, however, when the Constitutional Court shares jurisdiction with 
ordinary courts over certain matters. If the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to decide 
“complaints” in the area of fundamental rights, for example, there is a potential space for 
something like a writ of certiorary.8 Here the Court is basically the court of last resort 
concerning particular legal issues. In this context it is possible to argue that the fact that the 
Court refuses to hear a complaint does not mean that there has been no judicial decision on 
the matter. The case has been fully examined by lower courts9.   
The situation in the United States is different. Because the system is decentralized, the 
Supreme Court can be allowed to have discretionary jurisdiction (basically through the writ 
                                                 
7 This is not to deny that constitutional courts sometimes decline to decide upon the validity of 
a statute. In Italy, for example, the Constitutional Court sometimes refuses to answer a question 
raised by an ordinary judge with the argument that the problem whether the statute is constitutional is 
one concerning which the legislature should be granted a wide area of discretion. These decisions are 
not interpreted by the legal community to mean that the statute is actually constitutional, but rather 
that it is not for the Court to decide whether it is constitutional or not. For a description of this practice, 
see Paolo Bianchi, La creazione giurisprudenziale delle tecniche di selezione dei casi  (Torino: G. 
Giappichelli editore,  2000),  pp. 238-262. So, after all, it is possible for a Constitutional Court to find 
ways to decline to pass upon the validity of a statute. But the point is that Court will have to work its 
way towards avoidance. For structural reasons, the system is biased in the other direction. 
8 Actually, given the excessive workload of the Constitutional Court, there is a tendency in 
Germany and Spain to favor a system that would allow the Court to dismiss the complaints that are 
relatively unimportant from a constitutional point of view. For a general view of these proposals, see 
Pablo López Pietsch, “Objetivar el recurso de amparo: las recomendaciones de la Comisión Benda y 
el debate español”, Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, number 53 (1998), pp. 115-151. 
9 The exception to this discretionary or more flexible jurisdiction should occur in the relatively 
rare case when the complaint rests on the proposition that the applicable statute is unconstitutional. 
The Constitutional Court cannot refuse to decide the complaint in such a case, for here its refusal 
would mean that the party has not obtained an answer by the only institution that is authorized to 
reject a statute on constitutional grounds. 
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of certiorary). If the Court declines to decide a case where the validity of a statute is at stake, 
this does not mean that there has been no judicial review. Lower courts have dealt with the 
issue fully, since they share with the Supreme Court the power to set side a statute on 





4.2. NO CASE-BY-CASE MINIMALISM 
 
As stated previously, one of the typical avenues to reach the Constitutional Court is 
through an abstract challenge. When such a challenge is filed, the Court cannot limit the 
extent of the attack that the statute suffers. Because there is no concrete case that triggers the 
abstract challenge, the institution that files it can select the provisions of the statute that it 
finds unconstitutional and can impugn as many of them as it wants to.  
Moreover, because there is no concrete case that frames the constitutional inquiry, the 
challenger can oblige the Court to review the full consequences of the relevant provision. 
That is, although it is possible to distinguish different types of cases that a statute can be 
understood to deal with, the Court cannot decide that, for the moment, the question of the 
validity of the statute will only refer to its applicability to one type, leaving undecided 
whether the statute should be considered to be valid when applied to the other types. Since 
there is no concrete case, there is no justification for leaving undecided whether the statute is 
constitutional in its several aspects and consequences10.  
                                                 
10 Incidentally, it should be mentioned that, precisely because the scope of the attack is 
unlimited when abstract challenges are filed, in most countries these challenges can only be brought 
by a limited set of institutions. This is so in order to “protect” statutes. Given the democratic dignity of 
statutes, only some agents should be authorized to challenge them in the abstract, when there is no 
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This is in contrast to what happens in the American system, where a court may refuse 
to deal with the question whether a provision is valid, if that provision is not applicable to the 
case at hand. And the court can also confine itself to the question whether the statute is 
constitutional to the extent that it applies to a certain type of case, of which the actual case is 
an illustration, while leaving undecided whether that statute should be deemed to be valid if it 
had to be applied to a different type of situation.  
What the Supreme Court did in the Bowers v. Hardwick case, for example, can serve 
as an illustration11. The relevant statute criminalized sodomy, and it covered both homosexual 
and heterosexual intercourse. The Supreme Court held that the statute was valid, but it made 
clear that it was only ruling on the problem whether the statute was constitutional as applied 
to homosexual sodomy, because that was the specific kind of conduct that was present in that 
case. It left undecided whether that statute could be validly applied to heterosexual sodomy12. 
This strategy of partial avoidance would not be possible for a Constitutional Court to follow 
when it has to decide an abstract challenge. The challenger has the privilege to require the 
Court to address the constitutional issues fully. 
 The contrast between the two models should not be exaggerated in this regard, 
however. On the one hand, most Constitutional Courts have jurisdiction to decide, not only 
abstract challenges, but constitutional questions sent by ordinary judges too. In the context of 
these questions, there is a concrete case that triggers the process of review, and the 
Constitutional Court may decide to play the minimalist game. It need not examine all the 
aspects and consequences of the statute; only those that are relevant to decide that particular 
                                                                                                                                                        
case that justifies the process of review. It bears emphasizing that this protection takes place only in 
the context of abstract challenges, where the attack can extend to any provision, for any constitutional 
reasons, and where the full extent of the provision will have to be examined by the Court. For a similar 
thesis, see Luis Javier Mieres, El incidente de constitucionalidad en los procesos constitucionales. 
(Especial referencia al incidente en el recurso de amparo), op. cit., pp. 191-192.   
11 478 U.S. 186 (1986). This precedent has been recently overruled by the Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v Texas, June 26, 2003.  
12 It said: “The only claim properly before the Court… is Hardwick´s challenge to the Georgia 
statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality 
of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy”,  478 U.S 186, 196, footnote 2. 
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case need be dealt with. On the other hand, in the United States there is some room for 
abstract review. Although judicial review normally takes place in connection to a concrete 
case, it is sometimes possible for individuals and groups to challenge a statute on its face, 
even before it is actually applied13. Still, whereas abstract review is typical of the European 
model, it is rarer in the American model.  
   
4.3. THE DIFFICULTY OF AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS BY 
RESORTING TO ORDINARY LEGAL GROUNDS 
 
For structural reasons, Constitutional Courts find it difficult to decide cases on 
“ordinary legal grounds”. Normally, they have to invoke the Constitution. 
In the context of abstract challenges, it is obvious that the Constitutional Court cannot 
resort to “ordinary legal grounds”. The whole point of the procedure is to measure the 
validity of the statute under the Constitution, and the Court cannot therefore escape the 
constitutional issue.  
When constitutional questions are raised by ordinary judges, the situation is similar. 
In general, it is difficult for the Constitutional Court to decline to pass judgment on the 
constitutional validity of the statute. A division of labor underlies the dualist structure. 
Roughly, it is for the ordinary judge to select the statutory provision that is applicable to the 
case, while it is for the Constitutional Court to declare whether that provision is valid, should 
that judge entertain doubts about its validity. The dualist structure obliges the Court to be 
rather deferent towards the ordinary judge when it comes to the selection of the applicable 
legislation. It is not often the case that the Court tells the ordinary judge that, actually, the 
applicable statutory norm is not the one that the judge has selected, but a different one, so as 
                                                 
13 See Alec Stone Sweet and Martin Shapiro, “Abstract and Concrete Review in the United 
States”, in Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization (Oxford University 
Press, 2002), pp. 347-375. 
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not to have to pass constitutional judgment on the former14. (If there is someone who can 
more easily “avoid” the constitutional issue, it is the ordinary judge, but not the 
Constitutional Court, once the former raises a question to the latter).   
Finally, in the “complaints” procedure the Constitutional Court has more room for 
manoeuvre, since it does not have to review a statute under the Constitution, but has instead 
to decide a concrete case in light of fundamental rights. But even here there is a structural 
tendency to constitutionalize the legal problems. For the Court to be authorized to quash the 
decision of an ordinary judge, it must bring a constitutional objection against the way in 
which that judge has applied the law to the particular case. If the Constitutional Court wants 
to increase its power to review judicial decisions, it has to constitutionalize the legal 
problems, sometimes leading to “overconstitutionalization”15.  
In the United States, in contrast, all the courts have the two functions I distinguished 
earlier on, the “ordinary judicial function” and the “constitutional function”. Each court is in 
charge of selecting and applying the relevant legislation to cases, and examining whether that 
legislation comports with the Constitution. A court can therefore try to find ways to dispose 
of the case that make it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. The Supreme Court is 
authorized to do that as well: it is an “ordinary court”, after all.  
 
4.4. NO AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES THROUGH STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
  
                                                 
14 On the level of deference exhibited by the Spanish Constitutional Court in this connection, 
see Javier Jiménez Campo, “Cuestiones irrelevantes”, Anuario de Derecho Constitucional y 
Parlamentario, number 7 (1995), pp. 79-101. 
15 This impacts in a rather complicated way on the debate about whether or not constitutional 
rights bind private individuals, and whether they do so directly, or indirectly (by forcing the ordinary 
judges to interpret the relevant legislation in a way that protects fundamental rights in the private 
sphere). This is not the place to enter this discussion. For a sharp analysis, see Mark Tushnet, “The 
issue of state action/horizontal effect in comparative constitutional law”, I.CON. International Journal 
of Constitutional Law,  Volume 1, Number 1, January 2003, p. 79, especially pp. 84-88.   
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It is common practice for Constitutional Courts to preserve the validity of statutes 
through a saving construction, when such construction is possible. Thus, the Court may hold 
that the examined statute is constitutional to the extent that it is interpreted in a certain way, 
or to the extent that it is not interpreted in a certain way. Alternatively, the Court can use a 
negative formula: it can hold that the statute is unconstitutional if interpreted in a certain way, 
or unless it is interpreted in a certain way. (Since, from a theoretical point of view, nothing 
important depends on the formula that is used, I will always refer to the first formula, and 
assume that it is equivalent to the second)16.  
It is crucial to notice that when a Constitutional Court renders such an “interpretive 
decision”, which identifies the interpretive conditions under which a statute can remain in the 
system, it does not avoid the constitutional question at all. It fully deals with it, and gives an 
answer to it. It reads the Constitution in a particular way, gives a concrete meaning to it, and 
then decides what the statute must be interpreted to say in order for it to be in harmony with 
the Constitution. In doing this, the Court avoids striking down the statute, but it does not 
avoid examining and answering the constitutional question itself.  
To illustrate this point, here is an example: In its decision 74/1987, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court had to review a provision of the code of criminal procedure that grants 
detained individuals the right to be assisted by a translator if they are foreigners who do not 
understand or speak Castilian. A constitutional challenge was brought against this provision, 
on the grounds that it does not cover the case of Spanish citizens who are unable to 
understand or speak Castilian. Although Castilian is the official language in Spain, and 
                                                 
16 Sometimes there is a practical difference, though. In Italy, for example, only the decisions 
by the Constitutional Court that declare a statute unconstitutional are formally recognized by the legal 
system to have erga omnes effects. So ordinary judges feel bound by the Constitutional Court´s 
interpretation of the statute only if the decision it has rendered is technically one of unconstitutionality. 
For the Court to prevail it has to say that the statute is unconstitutional if it is interpreted in a certain 
way, or unless it is interpreted in a certain way. This requirement does not exist in Spain, however. On 
this difference, see Francisco Javier Díaz Revorio, Las sentencias interpretativas del Tribunal 
Constitucional (Editorial Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2001), pp. 80-81, 99-112. 
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citizens have the duty to learn it, other languages are also official in particular regions, and it 
is not impossible for a Spanish citizen to have difficulty in understanding or speaking 
Castilian. The Court held that it would be against the constitutional rights of due process and 
equality to deny arrested individuals who are Spanish citizens the right to have a translator in 
those circumstances. It then concluded that the statutory provision “is not unconstitutional if 
it is interpreted in the sense that it does not exclude Spanish citizens from the right to be 
assisted by a translator if they do not understand or speak Castilian”. It is obvious that the 
Court did not avoid the constitutional issue. On the contrary: it fully answered it. It held that 
the Constitution requires the legislature to grant Spanish citizens who are unable to 
understand or speak Castilian the right to be assisted by a translator. It then sought a remedy: 
it imposed a particular reading of the statute in order to save its validity.  
Could the Constitutional Court, however, engage in statutory interpretation in order to 
avoid the constitutional question itself? Given the structural reasons we have already 
examined, this is difficult. The Constitutional Court has no authority to impose a particular 
interpretation of the statute on the ordinary judges, unless that interpretation is grounded in 
the Constitution. That is, for the Constitutional Court to be authorized to impose its 
interpretation of the statute, it must hold that the statute would be unconstitutional if it were 
interpreted in a different way from the way the Court indicates.  
In the United States, in contrast, it is possible for courts (including the Supreme 
Court) to avoid constitutional issues through statutory interpretation. As the Supreme Court 
has held, “where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and 
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions can be 
avoided [a court´s] duty is to adopt the latter”17. When courts do that, they do not answer the 
question what the Constitution requires in connection to a particular problem. They leave 
                                                 
17 Delaware & Hudson case, 213 US 366, 408 (1909), quoted in Jones v. United States, 526 
US 227, 239 (1999).  
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undecided whether or not a statute that clearly expressed the disfavoured meaning would be 
constitutional. They set no precedent to this effect.  
If the Supreme Court can resort to this strategy of avoidance, this is due to the fact 
that, as an ordinary court, it can decide what meaning to ascribe to a statute as an ordinary 
legal matter. Because it has this authority, it can try to find an interpretation of the statute that 
will make it unnecessary to deal with a constitutional problem. Moreover, because it is both 
the supreme interpreter of federal statutes and the supreme interpreter of the federal 
Constitution, the authority of its statutory interpretations vis-à-vis lower courts is always the 
same, whether the foundation of those interpretations lies in the Constitution or in mere 
ordinary law18.  
So, while Constitutional Courts in Europe cannot, for structural reasons, avoid 
constitutional issues through statutory interpretations, there is room for that in the American 
system.  
 
5. THE VISIBILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
                                                 
18 It is true, as some American commentators have emphasized, that the Constitution is not 
completely irrelevant when courts resort to the avoidance canon. Although courts do not hold that the 
interpretation they leave aside is actually unconstitutional, they do say that it would give rise to 
constitutional doubts. This implies that, to a certain extent, they have taken the Constitution into 
account. Otherwise, they could not have been able to see any constitutional problem in the horizon. 
As Frederick Schauer says, when courts resort to the avoidance canon they bring the Constitution “in 
a whisper, rather than with a shout”. Frederick Schauer, “Ashwander Revisited”, The Supreme Court 
Review 1995 (University of Chicago Press), p. 88. The legislature, moreover, is unlikely to insist on a 
reading of the statute that raises constitutional doubts among courts. Still, there is a difference 
between rejecting an interpretation of the statute on the grounds that a constitutional problem would 
arise, on the one hand, and rejecting that interpretation on the grounds that it would make the statute 
unconstitutional, on the other hand. Technically speaking, there is no constitutional precedent yet 
when the court does the former -or, at least, the precedent does not have the same force it would 
have if the constitutional issue had been frankly decided. Indeed, there have been instances where 
the Supreme Court has later upheld an interpretation of the statute that had initially been avoided for 
constitutional reasons. See, generally, William Kelley, “Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-
Branch Problem”, 86 Cornell Law Review, 831 (2001), especially pp. 857-858, 864. Kelley explains 
that in the United States there has been an important historical shift in the way the avoidance canon 
has been applied. Until early XXth century, the avoidance canon was about preferring a reading of the 
statute that met constitutional scrutiny to another reading that was actually unconstitutional. Later, 
however, it was about avoiding an interpretation that merely raises constitutional doubts (pp. 839-
840). Note that the earlier understanding of the doctrine is the only one that, for structural reasons, 
Constitutional Courts are authorized to engage in.   
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So far I have argued that, for structural reasons, Constitutional Courts cannot easily 
avoid constitutional issues. I will now refer to another characteristic feature of Constitutional 
Courts: they tend to operate in a context of high public visibility. Several institutional factors 
work in this direction: 
 
a) First, because there is only one Court that can hold that a statute is invalid, the 
attention of political parties and of public opinion will focus on that Court. It is only there 
that the judicial fate of the democratic decision of Parliament will be decided. The drama 
unfolds on that stage only, and everybody is aware of it. In the United States, in contrast, 
people have to follow the decisions of all the courts, since all of them have the power of 
constitutional review, and all of them contribute to the decision whether or not to set aside a 
particular statute (until the Supreme Court settles the issue, if it does). As Alexis de 
Tocqueville noted a long time ago, in America a statute is attacked gradually: “its final 
destruction can be accomplished only be the reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries”19.   
 
b) Second, because the Constitutional Court is specialized in Constitutional matters, 
commentators do not have to make an effort to isolate the constitutional cases and place them 
apart from ordinary cases. Specialization simplifies public debate. Moreover, to the extent 
that the Constitutional Court decides in the abstract, it abstracts away from the particular 
circumstances of cases where the statute could be applied. It isolates the question concerning 
the validity of the statute and detaches it from other legal questions. In the United States, in 
contrast, constitutional cases are ordinary cases too. The constitutional questions are thus 
submerged in a wider set of ordinary legal questions. Again, as Tocqueville observed, “when 
                                                 
19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835), Volume I, Chapter VI (Vintage Books 
Edition, 1990), p. 102. 
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a judge contests a law in an obscure debate on some particular case, the importance of his 
attack is concealed from public notice”. This is in contrast to what would have happened if 
“the judge had been empowered to contest the law on the ground of theoretical generalities”, 
which is what happens when a statute is challenged in the abstract20.  
This contrast, of course, should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, some 
Constitutional Courts depart from the “pure model”, since they have jurisdiction over matters 
that are different from constitutional review of legislation. To the extent that this is so, 
ordinary legal questions and constitutional questions merge. On the other hand, thanks to the 
writ of certiorary, the United States Supreme Court has been able to focus on cases that raise 
constitutional issues, which nowadays make up a large percentage of its total workload. 
Moreover, when it pronounces on the constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme Court´s 
decision can acquire as much publicity as an abstract decision by a Constitutional Court.    
 
c) Third, to the extent that public officials or institutions are allowed to bring abstract 
challenges to the Constitutional Court, they tend to bring more media light. Their role in 
setting the agenda for the Court is very important, moreover. It would be rather improper to 
let the Court have discretionary jurisdiction when confronted with an abstract challenge that 
is brought by an important public institution. If the democratic legislature is “privileged”, in 
that its normative product can only be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, the institutional 
challengers are “privileged” too: they can require the Court to answer the objections they 
have articulated against the legislature. Public institutions have thus a crucial role in setting 
the agenda for the Constitutional Court, in contrast to what happens in America, where the 
Supreme Court creates its own agenda through the writ of certiorary. 
 
                                                 
20 Alexis de Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 102. 
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All these features push Constitutional Courts towards visibility. But visibility means 
“danger”. To the extent that the Court´s decisions are highly visible, they are more likely to 
generate controversy and resistance. The political science literature tells us that there is a 
correlation between low salience of courts and the diffuse support they get from the public at 
large21.  
 Now, if several factors move Constitutional Courts into a danger zone of high 
visibility, one would imagine that, in contrast to the courts in the United States, those Courts 
have a stronger structure or nature that allows them to tread into that dangerous terrain. The 
paradox is that things are rather the other way around: in comparison to ordinary courts, and 
other things being equal, Constitutional Courts are rather fragile from a structural point of 
view. 
 
6. THE FRAGILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
 
The relative fragility of Constitutional Courts derives from the dualist structure of 
which they are a part. While ordinary courts, which carry out the function that consists in 
applying legislation to decide concrete cases, are absolutely indispensable, Constitutional 
Courts are not. If they did not exist, and if no court had the power of constitutional review of 
legislation, negative consequences may result, but the situation would no be so serious than if 
ordinary courts did not exist. For many decades, few countries in the world accepted the 
institution of judicial review, and even now there are states that reject it.  
Ordinary courts, moreover, are often strongly linked to rule of law values. They 
appear as impartial third parties that decide the controversies among individuals, or among 
individuals and the public institutions. To the extent that people view ordinary courts as 
                                                 
21 See references in Barry Friedman, “Mediated Popular Constitutionalism”, 101Michigan Law 
Review 2595 (2003). 
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independent organs, they will support them and will be critical of efforts to undermine their 
independence. Constitutional Courts, in contrast, are relatively new institutions, and they are 
not purely “judicial”: they are specialized in politically sensitive issues; their members are 
usually selected in a more political manner; sometimes they decide challenges brought by 
political institutions, etc….. To the extent that Constitutional Courts appear to be more 
“political”, they cannot easily draw from the moral capital that ordinary courts may have 
accumulated as impartial interpreters and enforcers of the law22.  
In a monist structure things tend to be different. Because the courts that are 
empowered to exercise the constitutional function are the same ones that perform the 
ordinary judicial function, they are better protected against external attacks. When they 
exercise constitutional review of legislation, they can build on the legitimacy they have 
obtained in the system as courts of law. Quite probably, Franklin D. Roosevelt found 
resistance against his plan to restructure the Supreme Court, in part because the latter is an 
ordinary court of justice that people believe should be independent from political pressures. If 
Roosevelt had instead been struggling with a Constitutional Court, he would probably have 
found it easier to convince the public that his plan was a reasonable effort to curb the 
jurisprudence of a court that was too activist in the particular area of constitutional law. 
Ordinary courts would not have been affected by his plan.     
Precisely because Constitutional Courts are structurally more fragile, it is necessary to 
establish formal rules to better protect them. So, for example, Constitutional Courts are 
explicitly founded in the Constitution, so that they cannot be abolished, or their powers 
restricted, through ordinary legislation. In some countries, it is even impossible to abolish 
                                                 
22 In countries that have made a recent transition to democracy, however, the situation is 
normally different. The newly established Constitutional Court represents the values of the democratic 
system, while the ordinary courts are associated with the authoritarian past, if not with corruption. 
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constitutional review through a constitutional amendment23. Similarly, the number of judges 
of the Court is normally established in the Constitution. Parliament cannot, by enacting an 
ordinary statute, play with the numbers in order to allow the political majority to have a Court 
of its liking.       
Additional measures can be taken to protect the Constitutional Court. For example, it 
may be thought advisable not to allow judges to write dissenting and concurring opinions 
(however desirable they may be on other grounds). If the opinions and votes of the individual 
judges remain secret, the political branches cannot press them with implicit or explicit 
promises about future jobs once they leave the Court24.  Moreover, if the Court speaks 
publicly with one voice, it will be in a better position to resist criticisms. Actually, if it is not 
possible for judges to write dissents for the public to read, they have an incentive to try to 
reach an accommodation with the other judges on the Court. (As John Ferejohn and Pasquale 
Pasquino argue, a Court will tend to be “internally deliberative” if dissents are not authorized, 
while it will be “externally deliberative” if they are25). The decision the Court finally reaches 
may then be more moderate, and the political branches will be more willing to accept it.  
Also, it may be advisable not to design pure Constitutional Courts that are strongly 
autonomous from the ordinary judiciary. Thus, if a Constitutional Court is empowered to 
exercise some “judicial functions”, and if it is strongly connected with the ordinary judiciary 
(through constitutional “questions” or “complaints”, for example), then the Constitutional 
Court is more likely to be able to protect itself against governmental pressures or attacks. It 
                                                 
23 The Constitution of Portugal, for example, declares in its article 288, letter l) that it is not 
possible to amend the Constitution to eliminate “the scrutiny of legal provisions for active 
unconstitutionality and unconstitutionality by omission”. And in Austria, it is usually understood that 
only a total revision of the Constitution, which requires a referendum, and not an ordinary 
constitutional amendment, can abolish constitutional review.  
24 For a defense of this thesis, in connection with the Italian case, see Mary Volcansek, 
Constitutional Politics in Italy. The Constitutional Court (New York: St. Marttin´s Press, Inc., 2000), pp. 
8, 24. 
25John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, “Constitutional Courts as Deliberative Institutions: 
Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice”, in Wojciech Sadurski (editor), Constitutional 
Justice, East and West (Kluwer Law International, The Hague-London-New York, 2003), pp 21-36. 
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will appear as a “court”, the independence of which is as important as that of the rest of 
courts, rather than as a “political institution” that should be more sensitive to the external 
pressures that the political branches may exert.  The other side of the coin, though, is that 
ordinary courts may then offer some resistance against a Constitutional Court that tries to 
penetrate the judiciary and become the real “supreme” court (over the ordinary Supreme 
Court). In those circumstances, the Constitutional Court has less reason to fear the attacks of 
the political branches than those that may come from the ordinary courts26.   
 
7. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEFERENCE 
  
Given what I have said so far, one would be tempted to argue in the following way: if 
it is true that, other things being equal, a relatively pure Constitutional Court (a) cannot easily 
avoid constitutional issues, and (b) is relatively fragile in comparison to ordinary courts, then 
(c), other things being equal, the Court will tend to be deferent towards the legislature. I want 
to argue, however, that this is not so. Other things being equal, we should expect a 
Constitutional Court to be activist, not deferent.  
 The reason is this: the Constitutional Court is not likely to earn its own space in the 
institutional system if it regularly upholds the statutes that are challenged before it. What 
would be the point of establishing an institution the main function of which is to control the 
                                                 
26 Thus, a certain tension between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court is more or 
less inevitable in those systems where the latter is authorized to review the former´s decisions. 
Although it is not easy to define the boundaries between the two courts, the underlying tension can be 
accommodated if the two Courts act in good faith. Sometimes, however, the tension explodes. For a 
pathological instance of such tension, see a recent decision of the Spanish Supreme Court (First 
Chamber), of January 23, 2004, which condemns the judges of the Constitutional Court to pay 
damages to a citizen whose complaint had been declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court. 
The Supreme Court considers that the reasons for the Constitutional Court´s decision to declare the 
complaint inadmissible were insufficient, and that the plaintiff´s faith in the rule of law had thereby 
been harmed. According to the Supreme Court, the economic value of the harm that each judge 
caused to the plaintiff amounts to 500 euros. So each judge is obliged to pay 500 euros to the plaintiff. 
The Constitutional Court is outraged by this decision, of course, which seems to belong to a surrealist 
world. The decision, by the way, has been challenged before the Constitutional Court! The case is 
pending.     
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validity of legislation, if it turned out that it rarely invalidated a statute? Even if the Court had 
been created with the purpose not to “check” the legislature, but to “legitimate” it against 
constitutional objections, it would still have to be quite activist. As Charles Black explained 
in the American context, for a Court to be in the position to legitimate statutes, it is necessary 
for it to exercise the power of invalidation27. Who would be impressed by a Constitutional 
Court´s decision to uphold a particular statute, if that Court were always accepting their 
validity? 
An interesting case to consider in this regard is that of France. Because the French 
Constitutional Council is quite “pure” (apart from electoral matters, its basic function is to 
review legislation), it should not be surprising that its jurisprudence exhibits a high rate of 
declarations of unconstitutionality. It would be difficult for this Court to acquire institutional 
relevance if it rarely invalidated a statute. Moreover, given that it is normally the 
parliamentary opposition that challenges the statutes, the space that the Court has created for 
itself is that of distributing political power between the governing majority and the 
opposition28. (It is said that under the Presidency of Robert Badinter, there was the implicit 
rule that the Court should declare a statute unconstitutional in 50% of the cases). In this way, 
constitutional review makes up for the fact that there is no federal system in France, which is 
the strategy that is normally resorted to in order to divide power between the majority and the 
minority. 
In contrast, in a decentralized system of constitutional review, it is possible (but not 
necessary) for the courts to be very deferent towards the legislature. Since their space in the 
system as ordinary courts is absolutely protected, they have more flexibility as to how 
actively they want to exercise their constitutional function, which is “additional”.  They can 
                                                 
27 Charles Black, The People and the Court (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 34 et seq.  
28 For an examination of the role of the Constitutional Council within the French legislative 
process, see Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France (Oxford University Press, 1992). On 
the high rate of declarations of unconstitutionality in France, see Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with 
Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2000),  p. 63. 
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certainly be activist, but they can also choose to be extremely deferential without being 
institutionally embarrassed for it. 
Therefore, if one held the view that the statutes that the democratic Parliament enacts 
should benefit from a strong presumption of constitutional validity, and that only those 
statutes that are “clearly mistaken” should be invalidated, then it would be wrong to establish 
a Constitutional Court, since such a Court has an activist bias built in it. It would be less risky 
to rely on ordinary judges. The latter would perform their ordinary function of deciding 
concrete cases according to the law. In the rare event that the applicable statute was clearly 
unconstitutional, they would set it aside. Even if this happened very rarely, nobody would 
question the institutional relevance of those courts. Moreover, it seems advisable to rely on 
ordinary judges, who are not “experts” in constitutional law, to apply the “clear mistake” 
rule. One would imagine that when a statute is clearly unconstitutional, it exhibits a kind of 
defect that any judge will be able to identify, and that there is thus no need to establish a 
specialized court to this effect.  
From this perspective, it makes sense that Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, for 
example, have decided not to establish Constitutional Courts. In these countries only a very 
deferential conception of constitutional review is thought legitimate. In Denmark, it was not 
until 1999 that the Supreme Court rejected a politically important statute as being contrary to 
the Constitution. In Sweden and Finland, the Constitution explicitly announces the “clear 
mistake rule”: only when the statute is unconstitutional beyond any reasonable doubt may a 
court set it aside for purposes of deciding a case (article 14, Chapter 11, of the Swedish 
“Instrument of Government”, and section 106 of the Finnish Constitution)29. It would have 
been pragmatically inconsistent to lay down the clear mistake rule and then erect a 
Constitutional Court.  
                                                 
29 On the practice of constitutional review in these countries, see Jaakko Husa, Guarding the 
Constitutionality of Laws in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Perspective, 48 American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 345 (2000).  
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To put it in American terms, a Constitutional Court has not only an “anti-Bickellian” 
bias (in that it is difficult for the Court to implement the avoidance rule); it has also an “anti-
Thayerian” bias (in that it is difficult for it to follow the clear mistake rule)30. 
If, however, a Constitutional Court is not “pure”, but has additional functions (apart 
from reviewing legislation), its position is different. The more important these other functions 
are, the more easily the Court will be able to play the game of deference towards Parliament, 
if other factors push in that direction. Even if it turns out that only rarely does the Court strike 
down a statute, its role in the system will nevertheless be secure, since other functions will 
justify its existence. The German and the Spanish Constitutional Courts, for example, play an 
important role when they decide controversies between the central government and the state 
or regional governments, and when they decide complaints brought by individuals against 
administrative and judicial decisions. These Courts, for institutional reasons, enjoy more 
latitude to decide how deferential they wish to be when they review statutes in the abstract 
procedures. Even if constitutional review ceased to be “relevant”, because a very deferential 
standard of review was chosen, the position of those Courts would still be safe: the other 
tasks would be sufficient to ensure their institutional prominence.  
  Apart from these structural features (centralization, and the degree of purity of the 
Court), other factors may also contribute to encourage a Constitutional Court to be activist: 
 
a) A first factor refers to the selection and tenure of the judges of that Court. To the 
extent that judges may believe that some degree of deference towards the legislature is 
justified on democratic grounds, they will be less worried about deference is they are 
appointed through procedures that are relatively democratic. The same is true if they serve for 
a limited period of time, as is the case in many European countries.   
                                                 
30 James Bradley Thayer defended the clear mistake rule in his famous article “The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law”, 7 Harvard Law Review, 129 (1893). 
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b) A second factor is related to the level of rigidity of the Constitution. If the 
Constitution is not too difficult to amend, judges of the Constitutional Court may feel less 
restrained when they check legislation. They know that their rulings can be neutralized 
through a constitutional amendment. The easier it is to amend the Constitution, the less 
reason there is for a judge to be worried about the “counter-majoritarian” objection, and the 
more willing the political community will be to accept an activist Court. In general, European 
Constitutions are easier to amend than the United States Constitution, and this should be a 
contributing factor to judicial activism.   
 
c) A third factor refers to the strength of the doctrine of precedent. When the 
Constitutional Court (in a civil law system) interprets the Constitution in order to decide the 
validity of a statute, its interpretation of the Constitution has relevance, of course, within the 
legal system. The Court is expected to be coherent when it reviews other statutes in the 
future, and ordinary judges are expected to take that interpretation into account when they 
read statutes. But the precedential effects of the Court´s decision are not so strong than in a 
common law system. The Court has more room for flexibility and for future revisions. This 
compensates for its structural obligation to confront constitutional issues: although the Court 
cannot easily avoid the question what the Constitution requires in connection to a particular 
problem, its answer is not as conclusive as it would be in a common law system. It is more 
easily revisable in future cases. To the extent that this is so, the Court feels encouraged to 
engage in an activist reading of the Constitution.     
d) A fourth factor refers to the type of Constitution that the Court is in charge of 
enforcing. The more expansive the domain that is covered by the Constitution, the more 
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likely it is that the Court will be able to find in it a principle or set of principles that may be 
used to invalidate a statute.  
Thus, in comparison to the United States Constitution, modern Constitutions in 
Europe tend to be very rich in rights and principles. Moreover, the idea that fundamental 
rights bind, not only the government, but private individuals too (either directly or indirectly), 
expands the relevance of the Constitution as well: it imposes limits on individuals when they 
deal with others in the private sphere. As a result, the domain of “political justice” and the 
domain of “constitutional justice” (what the Constitution says about issues of political justice) 
tend to coincide in Europe31. It is not surprising, for example, that Robert Alexy, a leading 
German legal philosopher, has insisted that one of the big problems that a theory of 
fundamental rights has to solve is how to carve out an institutional space for the democratic 
legislature under such an expansive Constitution. For, if the Constitution covers so much 
terrain, and the Court is the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, what is left for the 
democratic branches to decide?32 The American Constitution, in contrast, imposes fewer 
constraints on the political branches. Even Dworkin, for example, who defends a moral 
reading of the Constitution that emphasizes the central place of the abstract principles of 
equality and basic liberty, has to acknowledge that the social and economic rights that he 
believes are part and parcel of a liberal theory of justice cannot be interpreted to be included 
in the American Constitution33. And his definition of a constitutional right is one that imposes 
restrictions on the government, not private individuals.  
                                                 
31 I am here borrowing the concepts and terminology of Larry Sager, “The Domain of 
Constitutional Justice”, in Larry Alexander (editor), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 235-270.  
32 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp….. For 
a comment on this book, with references to this problem, see Mattias Kumm, “Constitutional rights as 
principles: On the structure and domain of constitutional justice”, I.CON, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (forthcoming).    
33 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom´s Law (..), pp….  
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This contrast has historical origins. The American Revolution did not have to 
radically transform society in the way that the liberal revolutions in Europe had to. These 
European revolutions had to dismantle the feudal structures that the absolute monarchies had 
not been able to destroy completely. Thus, whereas the American Constitution tried to 
establish a few negative limits on the government, the European Constitutions contained an 
ambitious program of social transformation.  
Moreover, while in America it was originally expected that the Constitution would be 
enforced by courts, the European Constitutions were written under the assumption that the 
political branches, not courts, would take care of their protection and implementation. This 
contributed to their ambitious tone34. 
When more modern European Constitutions were adopted, and some form of 
constitutional review was in the background, they had to be were written more carefully35. 
But the fact that it was Constitutional Courts, and not ordinary courts, that were asked to 
enforce the Constitution against the legislature, made it possible for the Constitution to be 
drafted in more “philosophical” terms than if ordinary courts had been the ones in charge. 
The Constitution can resist full legalization if the institution entrusted with guarding it is not 
fully judicial. The Constitutional Court has a clear authority to use the Constitution to strike 
down legislation, no matter how peculiar the Constitution may be as a legal norm, no matter 
how much it differs from ordinary law. In contrast to what is true in the American system, a 
Constitutional Court does not need to rest its power of constitutional review on the fact that 
“it is emphatically the province of courts to say what the law is” (Marbury v. Madison). 
                                                 
34 It should be noted, however, that the general understanding in America was that courts 
would review legislation very deferentially. They would only set aside a concededly unconstitutional 
act. That is, they would apply the “clear mistake rule”. See, Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the 
Law of the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 34-38.   
35 Thus, Hans Kelsen, who took the Constitution seriously as a norm that had to be enforced 
by a Constitutional Court, insisted in not including too abstract terms in the Constitution, such as 
“justice”, “liberty”, and “equality”, but more precise and specific concepts instead. See Hans Kelsen, 
“La garantie jurisdictionnelle de la Constitution”, 44 Revue du Droit Public, 221-41 (1928). 
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The consequence of having a Constitution that covers so much, and that does so 
through abstract and “philosophical” clauses, is that it is difficult for a Court to argue that the 
Constitution is silent about a moral problem. When someone challenges a statute on the 
grounds that it violates a certain principle of justice, it is easy for him to connect that 
principle to some clause or set of clauses of the Constitution. The Court cannot react 
“passively” by saying that the Constitution is silent about the problem that the challenger has 
brought to the surface. The Constitution may be indeterminate (vague), but not silent. The 
only alternative strategy that a passive Court could resort to would be to use deferential 
standards when reviewing legislation under the rights and principles that the Constitution 
includes. But, as I have argued before, a Constitutional Court cannot go very far in this 
direction either. To the extent that its basic role in the system is to check legislation, it cannot 
say all too often that the statutes it reviews are coherent with the requirements that flow from 
the Constitution.          
 
8. CODA: A TENTATIVE ARGUMENT 
 
I am tempted to conclude my remarks with the following idea, which is concededly 
very speculative. If we accept that, other things being equal, and under certain assumptions 
about the degree of purity and autonomy of the Constitutional Court, such a Court (a) cannot 
easily avoid the constitutional issues that are presented to it, (b) is highly visible and 
relatively fragile, (c) cannot be too deferent towards the legislature, and (d) cannot easily 
deny that the Constitution speaks to the problems that are brought to its attention, then, 
shouldn´t we conclude that (e) such a Constitutional Court has a strong incentive to be good 
at the function it is expected to perform? Whether it upholds a statute or invalidates it, it has 
to do so on the basis of good reasons. Even if it does not persuade all the parties that its 
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decisions are right, it must convince as many people as possible that it is seriously doing its 
job, and that it was indeed a good idea to establish a Constitutional Court. After all, 
Constitutional Courts are not strictly necessary.   
